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UNDERSTANDING THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS
(Bwls) wlTH PARTICUTAR REFERENCE TO THE
tNTERNATTONAt MONETARY FUND (lMF)*

A. O, ADENUGA

r

imports. ln spite of this, world
trode, outpul ond employment
worsened. ln order to stem the
downword spirol trend in the

subscribed lo the orticles of
ogreement, by undertoking to
conform to set of norms of
behoviour thot ore combined in

economies of member countries,
some countries devolued their

the Fund's decision-moking

currencies ond introduced
complicoted restrictions on
foreign exchonge. All these

controls, however, proved selfdefeoting ond the possibility for

,l-

competitive edge wos lost.

At the end of the Second World
Wor, the leoding ollied couniries
considered vorious plons lo resfore
order in the comity of notions ond
restructure the world economy in
orderto prevent the recunence of

O. EVBUOMWAN-

such poinful crises. The country
representotives drew up the
chorter (or Articles of Agreement)
of on internotionol institution to

INTRODUCTION

the orticle ond olso porticipote in
process. To be o member of the

institution, countries opply ond ore

ollocoted quotos, in consononce
with members'relotive size in the
world economy: the lorger o
country's economy in terms of
output. ond the lorger ond more
voried its trode, the higherits quoto
tends to be. The originolmembers:
the United Stotes of Americo (USA),
the United Kingdom (UK), Fronce,
Germony ond Jopon were more
fovoured in the ollocotion of
quotos such thot eoch could
ovenule the decision of severol
members whose quoto ollocotion

Bretton Woods lnstitutions
Tn.(BWls)
very insignificont.
comprise moinly the
I
! lnternotionol Monetory Fund oversee the internotionol
monetory system ond promote Unlike some internotionol
(lMF) ond the lnternotionol Bonk
for Reconstruction ond both the eliminotion of exchonge orgonizotions (such os the United
Development (IBRD) - the World restrictions reloting to trode in Notions Generol Assembly)thot
goods ond services, ond the operote under o one-country-one

Bonk. The focus will be on the lMF.
The IMF wos conceived in July.
19

44 ot o United

conference held

of

Notions

Bretton
Woods, New Hompshire, United

Stotes of Americo, when

representotions of 45
Governments ogreed on o
fromework for economic
cooperotion designed to ovoid
repetilion of the disostrous
economic policies thot hod
contributed to the Greot
Depression of the 1930s. Todoy,
the number of countries hos grown
to 188 ond ony new sovereign
country joining the United Notions
hod outomoticolly become o
member of IMF ond World Bonk.

ln thot decode,

economic
octivities in the mojor industriol
countries weokened, with the
opplicotion of restrictions on

sto bility of

exchonge rotes.

The IMF come into existence in
December 1945, when the first 29
countries signed its Articles of
Agreement. Since then, theworld
hos experienced unprecedented
growth in reolincomes. Although,
the benefits of growth hove not
flowed equolly to oll-either within
or omong notions, there hos been
increose in prosperity thot controst
shorply with the interwor periods, in

is

vote principle, the IMF hos o
weighted voting system:the lorger
o country's quoto in the Fund, the
more votes it hos. However. the
Boord decisions ore bosed on
consensus omong its members
ond ore supported unonimously.

The objective of this poper is to
exomine ond discuss the workings
of the Bretton Woods lnstitution
with porticulor focus on the
lnternotionol Monetory Fund (lMF).
This is to enhonce understonding of
the exponded role of the lMF.

porticulor. The improvements
were ottributed lo the IMF's
conduct of economic policy,
including policies thot hove For eose of exposition, the poper is
encouroged the growth of divided into five porls. Following
internotionoltrode ond helped to
moke the economic cycle of
boom ond bustsmoother.
ln terms of membership, members

this introduction, Porl llexploins the

IMF's role in the world economy,
while Port lll presents relotionships
between the Fund ond its
members, highlighting member

'
Ihe viewa expressed ln fhb poperore those of the outhor ond do not repre.senf fhe offcio t posit'an of the Cenlrol Bonk
o f Nigedo ot
ihBoordof Directon.
Adenugo ond Evbuomwon ore Ass,bfont Director ond Assistonf Economisf, respeclivety, in Modetingond Forecostng
-11.t*Mocroeconomic ModellngDrvision, Reseorch Deportment of theCenlrolBonkof ruigeno.
Office,
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obligotion to the Fund ond Fund's
obligotion to its members. ln Port
lV, the exponded roles of the Fund

ore discussed, while
conclusion

is

the

contoined in Port V.

2. IMF'S TRADITIONAL ROLE IN

THE

WORLD ECONOMY

2.1 Purposes
ln o globolised world, the lMF, with

its universol membership, is

o
cornerstone for promoting growth
ond stobility. The Fund is the

centrol institution of the
internotionol monetory system

thot fosters internotionol poyments

ond exchonge rotes omong
notionol currencies ond

growth of world trode

orienled structurol reforms.

(v)

,

To give confidence to

members by moking the generol
resources of the Fund tempororily

ovoiloble to them under finoncing but to support
sof eguords, thus odjustment ond reform policies
providing then with opportunity to oimed ol correcting the
conecl molodjustments in their underlying problems. For
bolonce of poyments without exomple:
resorting to meosures destructive ..
During lhe 1997-98 Asion
of notionol or internotionol finonciol crises. the IMF octed
odequote

prosperity.

(vi) ln occordonce with the
obove, to shorten the durolion
ond lessen the degree of
disequilibrium in the internotionol
bolonces of poyments of
members.
The Fund sholl be guided in oll

countries to odopt sound

purposes setforlh in lhis Article.

economic policies, ond olso ossist
members in need for temporory
firloncing to oddress bolonce of

lhese purposes, the IMF:
. Monilors economic ond finonciol

The purposes of the lnternotionol
Monetory Fund ore:

(i) To promote internotionol

monetory cooperotion through o
permonent institution, which
provides the mochinery for
consultotion ond colloborotion on
intemotionol monetory problems.

(ii) To focilitote the exponsion ond
bolonced grovrth of internotionol
trode. ond contribute thereby to
the promotion ond mointenonce
of high levels of employment ond
reol income ond to development
of the productive resources of oll
members os primory objectives of

economicpolicy.
(iii)

To

promote exchonge stobility,

mointoin orderly exchonge

policies ond decisions

by

its

the

.

Provides

the governmenls ond

centrol bonks of its member

countries with technicol ossistonce
To serve

developments ond policies, in
member countries ond of the
globol level, ond gives policy
odvice to its members bosed on its

more thon fifty yeors of
experience.

For

exomple:

ond troining in its oreos of
expertise. For exomple:

.

Following the collopse

of the

Soviet Union, the IMF stepped in to
help lhe Boltic Stotes, Russio, ond
other former Soviet constituents set

up treosury

systems

for

their

respective centrol bonks os port of

. ln its onnuol review of the the tronsition from centrolly
Joponese economy, the IMF plonned to morket-bosed
Executive Boord urged the
Joponese government to

stimulote growth by keeping
interest rotes low, encouroging

economic systems.z discussing not
only notionoleconomic policies in
o globol contexf, but olso issues
importont to the slobility of the

corporote ond bonk restructuring,
ond promoting deregulotion ond
competition.

finonciol system. These included
countries' choice of exchonge

.

The IMF commended the
Mexicon outhorities for their
prudenl economic monogement.

It supported o move loword

groduol implementotion of
inflotion torgeting ond expressed

orrongements omong members,
ond ovoid competitive exchonge
depreciotion.

concern

(iv) To ossist in the estoblishment of
o multiloterol system of poyments

.ln

in respect of cunent tronsoctions
between members ond in the
eliminotion of foreign exchonge
restrictions, which homPer the

swiftly to help Koreo bolster its
reserves. lt pledged $21 billion to
ossist Koreo reform its economy,
restructure its f inonciol ond
corporote sectors, ond recover
from recession. Within four yeors,
Koreo hod recovered sufficiently
to repoy the loons ond, of the
some time, rebuild its reserves.

encouroge trode relotions omong
countries. ll oims to prevent crises
in lhe system by encouroging

poyments difficulties.

lends to member countries with
bolonce of poyments problems.
not just to provide temporory

obout the

undercopitolizotion of the bonking
system.

internotionol monetory ond

rote orrongements, the
ovoidonce of destobilizing
internotionol copitol flows, ond the
design of internotionolly
recognized stondords ond codes
for policies ond institutions.

The fund is helping to moke
globolizotion work for the benefit

of oll by strengthening to
strengthen

World Economic
IMF highlighted the

its Spring 2001

Outlook, the
risks of o further weokening of
globol growth ond the need for o
prooctive policy opprooch to
support demond ond for growth37

the

internotionol

finonciol system ond occeleroting
progress toword reducing poverty,
os well os promoting sound
economic policies omong oll its
member countries.

I
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Aport from rising prosperity, the
world economy ond monetory
system ln the decodes since
World Wor ll hove undergone

other mojor chonges. Ropid
odvonces

in technology

ond

communicotions hove
contributed to the increosing

internotionol integrotion of
morkets ond closer linkoges
omong notionoleconomies. As o
result of this, whenever finonciol
crises erupt, they now tend to
spreod more ropidly omong
countries.
The IMF medium of exchonge

the speciol drowing right

is

(SDR).

internotionolreserve
osset introduced by the IMF in
I969 (under the First omendment
to its Articles of Agreement) out of
concern omong IMF members
thot the current stock, ond

The SDR is on

prospective growth, of
internotionol reserves might not
be sufficient to support the

exponsion of world trode. The
moin reserve ossets were gold
ond U.S. dollors, ond members
did not wonl globol reserves lo
depend on gold production, with
its inherent uncertointies, ond

continuing U.S. bolonce of

poyments deficits, which would
be needed to provide continuing
growth in U.S. dollorreserves. The
SDR wos introduced os o

supplementory reserye osset,
which the IMF could "ollocote"
periodicolly to members when
the need orose, ond concel, os
necessory.

Although SDRs

-

sometimes
known os "popergold" -hove no
physicol form - hove been
ollocoted to member countries
(os book-keeping entries) os o
percentoge of their quotos. So
for, the IMF hos ollocoted SDR
2l.4 billion (obout $29 billion) to

member countries. The lost
ollocotion took ploce in 1981,
when SDR 4.1 billion wos
ollocoted to the l4l countries
thot were then members of the
lMF. Since 1981, the membership
hos not seen o need for onother
generol ollocolion of SDRs, porfly

becouse of the growth of
internotionol copitol morkets.
However. in light of the IMF's
exponded membership - which
included countries thot hod not
received on ollocotion - the
Boord of Governors, in
September 1997, proposed o
Fourth Amendment to the Articles
of Agreement. When opproved
by the required mojority of
member governments, this will
outhorize o speciol one-time
"equity" ollocotion of SDR 21.4
billion, to be distributed so os to
roise oll members' rotios of
cumulotive SDR ollocotions to

quotos to o common
benchmork.

exchonge orrongements ond
promote o stoble system of
exchonge rotes. The regulor
monitoring of economies ond
ossocioted provision of policy
odvice, thot IMF surveillonce
involves con help signol dongers
oheod ond enoble members to
oct in o timely woy to ovoid
trouble.
The IMF conducts its oversight in

lhreewoys:
Country surveillonce, which tokes
the form of regulor (usuollyyeorly)
comprehensive consultotions
with individuol member countries
obout their economic policies,

with interim discussions

os

erred to os "Article

lV

needed. The consultotions ore

IMF member countries moy use
SDRs in tronsoctions omong
themselves, with l6 "institutionol"
holders of SDRs, ond with the lMF.
The SDR is olso the IMF's unit of
occount. A number of other

internotionol ond regionol
orgonizotions ond internotionol
conventions use it os o unit of

occount or os o bosis for o unit of
occount.
The SDR's volue is set doily using o

bosket of four mojor cunencies:
the Euro, Joponese yen. pound

sterling, ond U.S. dollor. On
December30,20l l, SDR L535270
= US$I. The composition of the
bosket is reviewed every five

yeors

to

ensure thot

it

is

representotive of the cunencies
used in internotionol tronsoctions,
ond thot the weights ossigned to

the currencies reflect

their

relotive importonce in the world's
troding ond finonciol system.

2,ll

Advice on Policies ond

ref

consultotions" os they ore
mondoted by Article lV of the
IMF's

chorter.

The IMF stoff review the country's

mocroeconomic (fiscol,

monetory, ond exchonge rote)
policies, ossess the soundness of

the f inonciol system,

ond

exomine industriol, sociol, lobour,
governonce, environmentol ond
other policy issues thot moy
offect mocroeconomic policies
ond performonce. The stoff teom

then submits o report on its
findings, opproved by
monogement, to the Executive
Boord, which discusses the
onolysis by the Stoff. And the
Boord's views, summorized by its
Choirmon, ore tronsmitted to the
country's government. ln this
woy, the views of the globol
community ond the lessons of
internotionol experience ore
brought to beor on the policies of
the countryconcerned.

GlobolOversighl
The IMF's Articles of Agreement
empowered it to oversee the

internotionol monetory system,
firm
"suryeillonce" - thot is, oversightover the exchonge rote policies
of its member counfries. Eoch
member country undertokes to
colloborote with the IMF in its

including exercising

efforts to ensure orderly
38

Globol surveillonce entoils review
by the IMF's Executive Boord of
globol economic trends ond
developmenls. The moin reviews
of this kind ore bosed on World

Economic Outlook reports
prepored by IMF stoff, normolly
twice o yeor, before the semi-

onnuol meetings of the
lnternotionol Monetory ond
Finonciol Committee (|MFC). The

]
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reports ore published in fullpriorto

the IMFC meetings, togetherwith
the Choirmon's summing up of
lhe Executive Boord's discussion.

cooperotion with IMF stoff, ond is
toilored to the speciol needs ond
circumstonces of the country.

pursued under regionol

onongements. These include,
Boord discussions focusing on
developments in the Europeon
Union. the euro oreos, the West
Africon Economic ond Monetory
Union, the Centrol Af ricon

Economic ond Monetory

Community, os well os the Eostern

Coribbeon Cunency Union.

IMF

monogement ond stoff olso
porticipote in surveillonce
discussions of such groups of
countries os the G-7 (the Group of
Seven mojor industriol countries)
ond the Asio-Pocific Economic
Cooperotion (APEC) forum.

2.lll

IMF Lending Role

The IMF lends foreign exchonge

to

countries with bolonce of

poyments problems. An IMF loon

eoses the odjustment thot o
country hos to moke to bring its
spending in line with

income so
bolonce of

its

os to conect its
poyments problems. But IMF
lending is olso intended to
support policies, including
structurol reforms ond groMh
prospects in o lostingwoy.

The IMF olso provides the
country's outhorities with odvice
on the economic policies thot
moy be expected to oddress the
problems most effectively. For
the IMF to provide finoncing. it
must ogreewith the outhorilies on
o progromme of policies oimed
of meeting specific, quontified
gools, regording externol viobility,
monetory ond finonciol stobility,
ond sustoinoble growth. Detoils
of the progromme orespelled out
in o "letter of intent" from the
government to the Monoging
Directorof the lMF.

A progromme supported by IMF
finoncing is designed by the
notionol outhorities in close

The cost to bonowers

is

subsidized

This is essentiol for the

with resources roised through

for the governmenl to win
notionol support for the
progromme. Such support - or

purpose byits members.

progromme's effectiveness ond

Regionol surveillonce, under
which the IMF exomines policies

protrocted bolonce of poyments
problems solve their difficulties.

"locol ownership" - of the
progromme is criticol to its

post soles of lMF-owned gold,
together with loons ond gronts
provided to the IMF for the

designed flexibly, so thot, during

Supplementol Reserve Focility
(SRF): Provides odditionol shortterm finoncing to member

circumstonces chonge. Mony
progrommes ore, in foct, revised
during implementotion.

sudden ond disruptive loss of
morket confidence reflected in

success. Eoch progromme is olso

its implementotion, it moy be
reossessed ond revised if

2.lV

poyments difficulty becouse of o

copitol outflows. The interest rote
on SRF loons includes o surchorge
overthe IMF's usuollending rote.

IMF Focilities

The IMF provides loons under o
voriety of policies of "focilities"
thot hove evolved over the yeors

lo meet the needs of the
membership. The durotion,
repoyment terms, ond lending

lo

conditions ottoched
these
focilities vory, reflecting the types
of bolonce of poyments problem
ond circumstonces they oddress.

Most of the IMF's finoncing is
provided through some of the
f

countries experiencing
exceptionol bolonce of

ollowing lending policies:

Stond-By-Arrongements: lt
provides ossuronce to o member
country thot it con drow up to o
specified omount, usuolly over l2
- l8 months, to deolwith o short-

lerm bolonce of poyments
problem.

Contingent Credit Lines:
Precoutionory lines of defense

enobling members pursuing
strong economic policies to
obtoin IMF finoncing on o shortterm bosis when foced by o
sudden ond disruptive loss of
morket confidence becouse of

conlogion from difficulties

in

othercountries.

Emergency Assistonce:

in 1962 to help
members cope with bolonce of
poyments problems orising from
sudden ond unf oreseeoble
noturol disosters, this form of
ossistonce wos extended in 1995
to cover certoin situotions in
which members hove emerged
from militory conflicts thol hove
lntroduced

disrupted institutionol ond

Extended Fund Focility: Provides

odministrotive copocity.

specified omount, usuolly over
three to four yeors, to help it
tockle structurol economic
problems thol ore cousing serious

.

ossuronce thot o member
country con drow up to o

weoknesses
poyments.

in its bolonce of

Poverty Reduclion ond Growth
Focility (PRGF): This f ocility

reploced the Enhonced

Structurol Adjustment Focility in
November 1999. A low interest
rote focility helps the poorest

member countries focing
39

2.V

Key feotures of IMF lending
The IMF is not on oid ogency oro

development bonk. lt lends to
help its members tockle bolonce
of poyments problems ond
restore sustoinoble economic
growth. The foreign exchonge
provided, the limits on which ore
set in relotion to o member's
quoto in the lMF, is depositedwith
the country's centrol bonk to

supplement its internotionol
reserves ond thus to give generol

bolonce of poyments support.

Unlike the loons of development

Volume 35, No.
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ogencies, IMF funds ore not
provided to finonce porticulor
projects or octivities.

.

IMF lending is conditionol on
policies: the bonowing country
must odopt policies thot promise
to conect its bolonce of poyments

problem. The conditionolity

ossocioted with IMF lending helps
to ensure thot by bonowing from
the lMF, o country does not just

postpone hord choices ond
occumulote more debt, but is
oble to strengthen its economy
ond repoy the loon. The country
ond the IMF musl ogree on the
economic policy octions thot ore
needed. Also the IMF disburses
funds in phoses, linked to the
bonowing country's meeting ils
scheduled policy commitments.
During 2000-2001 the IMF worked
to streomline its conditionolity moking it more shorply focused on
mocroeconomic ond finonciol
sector policies, less intrusive into
countries' policy choices, more
conducive to country ownership
of policy progrommes, ond thus
moreeffective.

.

IMF lending is temporory.

Depending on the lending focility
used, loons moy be disbursed over
periods os shorl os six months ond

os long os four yeors.

The

repoyment period is 3 - 5 yeors for
short-term loons (under Stond-ByAnongements), or 4 - l0 yeors for
medium-term finoncing (under
Extended Anongements); but in
November 2000, the Executive
Boord ogreed to introduce the
expectotion of eorlier repoyment
- over 2 to 4 yeors for Stond-By
Anongements ond 4 - 7 yeors for

Extended Anongements.

The

repoyment period forloons to lowincome countries under the IMF's
concessionol lending focility, the
PRGF, is l0 yeors, with o 5 - yeor

groce period on principol
poyments.

.

The IMF expects bonowers to
give priority to repoying its loons.
The bonowing country must poy
bock the IMF on schedule, so thot
the funds ore ovoiloble for lending

to other countries thot need

bolonce of poyments finoncing.
The IMF hos in ploce procedures to
deter the building-up of ony
orreors, or overdue repoyments
ond interest chorges. Most
importont, however, is the weight
thot the internolionol community
ploces on the IMF's stotus os o
prefened creditor. This ensures
thot the IMF is omong the first to be
repoid even though it is often the
lost lender willing to provide o
country with funds, ofter the

DECEMBER 20I

ore os provided by the Articles of
Agreement.
3.

I

Members'Role lo lhe Fund

The members' role to the Fund
does not stort ond end with the
provision of Funds'resources. The
doy{o-doy running of the Fund
lies in the honds of the Executive
Boord of Governors. on which oll

member counlries ore
represented. The Boord of

question.

is the highest decisionmoking ond governing body of
the IMF institution. The stoff of the
Fund ore recruited from member

.

countries. but since these stoff ore
internotionol civil servonts, their

country's obilily

to fulfill its

obligotion hos cleorly come into
Countries thot bonow from the
IMF's regulor, non-concessionol
lending windows - oll but lhe lowincome developing countries poy morket-reloted interest rotes
ond service chorges, plus o
refundoble commitment fee. A
surchorge con be levied obove o
certoin threshold to discouroge

heovy use of IMF funds.

Surchorges olso opply to drowings
under the Supplementol Reserve

Focility. Low-income

countries

borrowing under the Poverty
Reduction ond Growth Focility
poy o concessionol fixed interest
rote of 0.5% percent o yeor.

.

ln most coses, the lMF, when it

lends, provides only o smoll
portion of o country's externol
finoncing requirements. But
becouse the opprovol of IMF
lending signols thot o country's
economic policies ore on the right
trock, it reossures investors ond the

officiol community ond helps
generote odditionol finoncing
from these sources. Thus, IMF
finoncing con octos on importont
lever, or cotolyst, for ottrocting
otherfunds.

3.

RETATIONSHIP BETWEEN

IMF AND

ITS

Members' relotionship with the IMF

ond vice verso is determined by
eoch member's role to the IMF
through Monogement of the IMF
resources;

ond the Fund's role to members
40

responsibilily is to the Fund ond not
to notionol outhorities.

The IMF's resources come moinly
from the quoto subscriptions thot

countries poy when they join the
Fund or following periodic review;
olthough the Fund con olso
bonow. The lorger o country's
economy in terms of output ond
the lorger ond more vorioble its
trode, the higherits quoto lends to
be. Cunently, USA is the World's
lorgest economy ond contributor
to the lMF. Quoto olso determines
o country's voting power, the
omount of finoncing thot o
country con receive from IMF ond
its shore in Speciol Drowing Right
(SDR) ollocotions.
3.

ll

Fund's Role to ils Members

The IMF is occountoble

lo

its

member countries ond this

to its
effectiveness. Unlike other
occountobility is essentiol

internotionol orgonisotions, most
decisions of IMF ore bosed on
consensus omong its members
ond ore supported unonimously.

ln line with the Articles of
Agreement, IMF helps
by:

MEMBERS

ond provision of the

Governors

its

members

.

Reviewing ond monitoring
notionol ond globol economic

ond finqnciol developments.
. Lending them hord cunencies to
support odjustment ond reform

I
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policies designed to correcf
bolonce of poyments problems
ond promote sustoinoble growth;
ond

.

Offering

o wide ronge of

technicol ossistonce, os well os
troining for government ond
Centrol Bonk Officiols, in its oreos
of expertise.

The IMF therefore. conducts its
oversight surveillonce functions in
threewoys.

(o) Country

surveillonce,

which is otten refened to os Article
lV consultotion. ln this process, IMF
stoff tokes regulor comprehensive

consultotions with individuol
member countries obout their

economic policies. The Executive
views of such consultotions ore
subsequently tronsmitted to the

country's government.
findings

ond

of such Article

lV

consultotions ore now being
published for public informotion.

(b) Globolsurveillonceentoils
the reviews by the IMF's Executive
Boord of globoleconomic trends
ond developments. The moin
reviews ore bosed on world
economic outlook reports

prepored by IMF Stotf. The reports
ore normolly published in full prior
to lnternotionol Monetory ond
Finonciol Committee meetings,
together with the Choirmon's
summing up of the Executive
Boord's discussion. lt is olso ofter
such meetings thot internotionol
globol development, prospects

ond policy

issues offecting
internotionol copitol morkets ore
published.

(c) Regionol surveillonce
under which IMF exomines

policies pursued under regionol
onongements. Here IMF Stoff

porticipote

in

discussions/meetings on

for exomple,
Europeon Union, the Euro oreo

developments
ond the likes.
IMF lends

its

income, so
os to correct its bolonce of
poyments problem. IMF lending is
olso intended to support policies
including structurol reforms thot
will improve o country's bolonce
of poyments position ond groMh
prospects in o losting woy. Such
loons enoble countries in difficulty
to moke externol poyments ond
mointoin on oppropriole level of
reserves, without toking meosures
thot will be destructive of notionol
or internotionol prosperity. To
prevent countries in difficulty
odopting such meosures which
included trode restrictions ond
poyments, o shorp compression of
demond in domestic economy, or
o shorp depreciotion of the
domestic currency, in omong the
purpose which IMF exists to serve.
spending in line with

its

to countries in difficulty
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An IMF Stond-By Anongement

is o
decision of the Fund by which o
member is ossured thot it will be
oble to moke purchoses from the

Generol Resources Account
(GRA) in occordonce with the
terms of the decision during o
specified period ond up to o

specified omount. This
orrongement is o controct
designed to provide short-term
bolonce of poyments ossistonce

for deficits of o temporory noture.
SBA usuolly

cover o period of one

to two yeors (olthough they con
olso be for periods of less thon o
yeor or up to three yeors). with
quorterly performonce criterio
ond semi-onnuol reviews.

member hoving o Stond-by
Anongement will hove the right to

A

engoge in the tronsoctions

The IMF provides loons under o
voriety of focilities thot hove
evolved over the yeors to meet
the needs of the membership.

covered by the Stond-by
Arrongements without further
review by the Fund. The right
could be suspended only with
regords to request received by

The durotion, repoyment terms
ond lending conditions ottoched
to these focilities vory, but reflect
the iypes of bolonce of poyments
problem o member moy hove

the Fund ofter o formol ineligibility
i.e o decision of the Executive
Boord to suspend tronsoctions
either generolly or in order to
consider o proposol mode by on

ln

conformity with recent chonges,

the Boord's discussions

to moke such countries bring

.

ond circumstonces they oddress.

Executive Director, or the

Most of the IMF finoncing ore
provided through three different

suppress or lo limit the eligibility of

types of lending policies:

consultotions between the
Fund ond the member ond on
ogreementwould be reoched on
the terms for the resumption of
such purchoses.

3.ll.l

Stond-By Arrongements

(sBAs)

This forms the core of the IMF
lending policies ond deols moinly

with short-term bolonce of

poyments problems. IMF seol of
opprovol. implied by the gronting
of o stondby orongement ofter
discussion with o country obout its
economic plons, is on importont
foclor in encouroging privote
copitol flows to such country.
Stond-by Anongement provides
ossuronce to o member country
thot it con drow up o specified
omount, over 12 - 18 months
period, to deol with short-term
bolonce of poyment problem.

Monoging Director, formolly to
the member. Usuolly, therewould

be

The benefits derivoble from
proper implementotion

of

SBA

include the following:

.

Reduction in the growth of
moneysupply.
. lncreose in the net internotionol
reserves.

.

Achievement of stoble ond
morket determined exchonge

rote.

.

Strenglhen supervisory ond
regulotory octivities over the
finonciol sector to improve the
system's soundness.

.

Enhoncement of effective ond
efficient monetory policy.
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The use of IMF resources under on

.

Due regord is poid

to

of economic performonce criterio
ond reviews of progress under the

the
domestic economic, sociol ond
politicol objectives of member
countries.

criterio typicolly include:

.

SBA is subject

to the observonce

progromme supported by the
onongement. The performonce

budgetory ond credil ceilings,
ovoidonce of restrictions on
cunent inlernotionol poyments
tronsfers, limits on the omount

ond

moturity of new short-ond
medium term externol debt,

ovoidonce of externol poyments
orreors, ond mointenonce of
minimum levels of net foreign
reseryes. Often, these crilerio
moy be direclly linked to certoin

The number ond content of
performonce criterio moy vory
due to the diversity of problems
ond institutionol onongements of
members.

.

The Monoging Director will
ensure odequote coordinotion in
the opplicotion of policies reloting
to the use of the Fund's generol

o view to
mointoining the non-

resources with

octions, such os specific reforms in
tox odministrotion or the finonciol

discriminotory treotment of

ottoinment of the objectives of
the economic progromme. ln
oddition, members ore expected
to odopt economic policies thot
will resolve their bolonce of
poyments difficulties within o

. There willolwoys be provision for

sector necessory for the

members.

o

review

if the performonce

3.ll.lll
(EFF)

o medium lerm extended
focility intended for countries with
bolonce of poyments difficulties
reloted to structurolproblems thot
toke longer time to conect thon
mocroeconomic weoknesses. lt
wos o mojor innovotion in IMF
policy oimed of providing finonce
for poor countries outside the
quoto resources of lMF. lt is
finonced by member industriol or
middle income countries in the
form of loons ond gronts.

Guidelines

worthy of nole thol the use of
Fund's Generol Resources ond
Stond-By Anongements follows
the guidelines on conditionolity os
enumeroted below:
It

is

. Members should be encouroged
to odopt conective meosures,
supported by the use of the Fund's

generol resources of on eorly
stoge of theirbolonce of poyment
difficulties.

. The normol period for on SBA is
one yeor. However, it moy be
extended up to, but not beyond,

three yeors.

Growth Focility (PRGF)

The Extended Structurol
Adjustment Focility (ESAF) which
hos now been chonged into the
Poverty Reduction ond Growth
Focility (PRGF) in the context of
debt relief initiotive for the Heovily
lndebted Poor Countries (HIPC) is
reviewed every five yeors. This
chonge from ESAF to HIPC come
into being in November 1999;

oimed ot moking poverly

reduclion ond economic growth
the centrol objectives of policy
progrommes in the countries
concerned.

According
The Extended Fund Focility

This is

3.ll.ll SBA Condilionolity

3.ll.lV Poverly Reduction ond

criterio could notbe met.

reosonoble period.

The SBA conditionolity provides
ossuronces to the country thot os
long os it implements the ogreed
policies; it will continue to receive
finoncing commitment from the
Fund while it provides sofeguords
to the IMF thot the finoncing
commifment obtoined would be
utilized for the intended purposes
thus guoronteeing repoyment.

focility ronges from on overoge of
150% of quoto to o moximum
occess of 350 percent, in
exceptionolcoses.

A speciol feoture of the focility
wos the submission of o policy
frome- work poper (PFP) by the
country need of the funds'focility.

The poper (PFP) detoils public

investment progrommes,

finoncing needs over o period of
three yeors, os well os structurol
odjustment policies to be
undertoken to reduce obstocles

to

sustoinoble growth ond

bolonce of poyments viobility.
Loons under the progromme ore
highly concessionol, with interest
rote of O.5% ond repoyment
periods ronging from 6 - l0 yeors
ofterdisbursement. Access to the

to the

Monoging

Director of lnternotionol Monetory

Fund (lMF), IMF should ploy on

octive port in moking globol

economic integrotion work for the
benefit of oll members. Therefore,
the IMF should remoin engoged in
the poor developing countries
through the Poverty Reduction
ond Growth Focility (PRGF) ond

the Highly lndebted

Poor

Countries (HIPC) initiotive.
Reducing poverty requires

sustoined globol exponsion ond
the induslriol countries must
recognise thot it is in their own
interest to come forword with bold
initiotives to open their morkets, to
provide generous debt relief ond

higher levels of officiol

development ossistonce.

The IMF is o monetory not o
developmentol institution but hos
on importont role to ploy in
reducing poverty in its member
countries. At the heort of IMF
mondote is sustoinoble economic
growth, which is essentiol for
reducing poverty ond requires
sound mocroeconomic policies.
ln post yeors. vorious policy
options hod been odopted but
with little or no impoct on poverty
reduction. ln 1999, therefore. ot
the onnuolmeeting of lMFond the
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World Bonk, Ministers ond
member countries endorsed o
new opprooch lo poverty

reduction strotegies. They
decided to moke countries
generote poverty Reduction
Strotegies Popers (PRSPs), the
bosis of oll IMF ond World Bonk
concessionol lending ond debl
relief.

The New opprooch to poverty
reduction focuses on the poor os
their needs get firsl priority with
brood porticipolion of the civil
society when formuloting the
strotegy. lt ploces the poor
countries on the "driving seot" of
their own development, wilh o
cleorly orticuloted vision for their
future ond o systemotic plon to

ochieve their gools. The
opprooch hos four bosic

principles, which hove guided the

development of poverty
reduction strotegies. These
include:

One of the remorkoble

developments of the post yeors
hos been thot the developing
countries hove occupied on
increosingly centrol position in the
institutions

functioning.

due to deterioroting living
conditions in developing
countries ond the Lotin Americon
debt crisis which mode IMF to

strengthen its focus on growth,
strucf urol odjustment, ond
externol debt monogemenl.

ln the '1990s, the tronsformotion of

centrolly plonned economies into
free morket societies ond lhe
issues of poverty olleviotion in the

poorest countries os well

os

concerns regording the
functioning of globol finonciol

morkets ond the soundness of
finonciol systems hove prompled
o mojorwidening of the core tosks
of the IMF ond other speciolised

institutions. Surveillonce

for crisis prevention. The IMF hos,
of poverty ore essentiol.
. Fostereconomic grovrth

criticol
for sustoined poverty reduction
ond greoter porticipotion by the
poor con increose o country's
growth potentiols.
is

.

therefore, token the leod in
concerted vigilonce over the
soundness of finonciol systems.

must work together closely ond
the focus cleorly on result.

4.

THE EXPANDED ROTE OF

THE

FUND

The chonging circumstonces in
the world economy hove required
IMF to redefine, reossess ond
refocus its priorities. Refocusing of
priorities hos been o continuous
process in the workings of IMF ond
this hos hod o solutory impoct on
the IMF's development ond
governonce.

Money Loundering ond
Comboting Finoncing Terrorism
(AML/CFT) to the list of I I oreos
where stondords ond codes ore
useful to the operotionol work of
the Fund. They ogreed olso to
odopt the Finonciol Aclion Tosk

Force (FATF) ossocioted

stondords.
Four principles highlighted for the

Fund/Bonk Stoff involvement in
AML/CFI ossessment include:

(o) The ossessment of nonprudentiol reguloted finonciol
sectoroctivities.

(b)

Allossessmentprocedures

should be tronsporent ond
consistent with the mondote ond

core expertise of the different
institutions involved, ond
compotible with the uniform,

@ Assessment

Terrorism

proceeds of illegol octivilies hod
long been identified os issues of
globol concern. The issue
become more wonisome ofter
the September 11 , 2001 tenorist
otlock on the United Stotes of
Americo. The Fund ond the World
Bonk hod been ploying on octive
role in the internotionol efforts to

The development community

ottheirmeeling of

July 2002 endorsed odding Anti-

4. I Comboting ond Finoncing of

reduction

vitol.

The Fund Boord

volunlory ond cooperotive noture
of the ROSC exercise;

The obuse

is

institutions.

One of these exponded role ond
suryelllonce ocllvltles of lhe fund
lncluded.

Country "ownership" of the
gools. strotegy ond direction of

development ond poverty

enhoncing finonciol stobility ond

sound notionol ond regionol

This wos

continues to be the key instrument

. A comprehensive opprooch to
development ond o brood view

weoknesses in the finonciolsystem
ond ore, therefore, contributing to

of the

internotionol

finonciol system to finonce
terrorism ond lounder the

fight money loundering. The
Finonciol Sector Assessment

should be followed

up with technicol ossistonce ot
the request of the jurisdictions
concerned; ond

(d) Assessments should be
conducted in occordonce with
comprehensive ond integroted
methodology.

Anti-Money

Loundering/Comboting the

Finoncing of Tenorism (AML/CFT)
ossessment is now stondord
components of Finonciol Sector
Assessment Progromme (FSAP)
ond Offshore Finonciol Centres

Progromme (FSAP) developed by

Assessment (OFC).

contributing lo the strengthening
of sound finonciol systems in
member countries. The in-depth
onolysis conducted during the
exercise ore very helpful in

4.ll

the Fund ond World Bonk is

identif ying ond correcting
43

Sovereign

Debl

Restrucluring Mechonism

(sDRM)
The IMF os port of its on-going work

on crisis prevention ond resolution,

I
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hos begun discussions on how to
ossist countries with unsustoinoble

debts resolve such issues in on
orderly monner. To ovoid crisis, the

Fund os port of its obligotion is
considering two complementory
opprooches to creoting o more
orderly ond predicloble process
for sovereign debt restructuring :

(o) A controctuol opprooch in
which debt restructuring would be
focilitoted by enhonced use of
certoin controcluol provisions in
sovereign debt controcts; ond
(b) The estoblishment of o
Universol Stotutory Fromework,
which would creote o legol
fromework for collective decision
moking by debtors ond o super
mojority of creditors. With the
obove in mind, the Executive
Boord hod hod discussions thot
provided o preliminory discussion

on two centrol issues in the design
of SDRM. They ore the scope of
the debt thot SDRM will cover ond
cloimsinvolved.

4.ll.l

difficulties equolly provide the

motivotion for controctuol
opprooches to improving
sovereign debt restructuring

mechonisms. The cunent process
sovereign debt sustoinobility
imposes undue costs on both the
debtor country ond creditors
becouse it is prolonged ond
unpredictoble. lt moy olso risk
contributing to contogion, with
ossociote costs ond risks for the

of

stobility

of the

internotionol

finonciolsystem.
Agoinst this bockground, there is
on increosing recognition in both
the officiol sector ond privote
morkets for the cunent process of
restructuring the debt of o

sovereign, to be improved.
Therefore, the obiective of the
sovereign debt restructuring
mechonism is to provide o
fromework thot strengthens
incentives for o sovereign ond its
creditors to reoch o ropid ond
colloborotive ogreement on o
restructuring of unsustoinoble
debt in o monner thot preserves
the economic volues of ossets ond

RotionolefortheSDRM

Often, countries experience
severe finonciol difficulties os o

result of mojor portfolio
imbolonces or through bolonce

sheet difficulties, extending
beyond the sovereign. A
resolution of such flnonciol crisis
ond o retum to sustoinoble growth

o return to mediumterm viobility. For such o
mechonism to ochieve its
focilitotes

objective, it must not only oddress

collective oction problems

element

of o brooder

crisis

resolution strotegy.

reserves

of the

country,

in its

ottempt to stem pressures from
copitol outflows. Also, efforts to

resolve collective oclion

. Any interference with
controctuol relotions should be
limited to those meosures thot ore
needed to resolve the most

importont collective oction

problems. The principolfeoture of

the mechonism is thot it would
ollow o sovereign ond quolified
mojority of creditors to reoch on
ogreement thot would then be
mode binding on ollcreditors thot

ore subject to the restructuring,
poying due regord to seniority
omong cloims. The merits of

Principles Guiding the
Design of lhe Mechonism

whether it does so in o monner thot

collective oction problem;

(ii)

minimizes interference with

controctuol rights ond obligotions.
The design

of o mechonism thot

would ochieve the obove . The fromework should

.

investment, finonciol sector

creditors ond should estoblish o
procedure lhot enobles the
restructuring process to be
completed within o reosonoble
timefrome.

relotions must be ossessed in terms
of: (i) whether it resolves o criticol

difficulties ond o droin on externol

SDRM

colloborotive engogement
between the debtor ond its

its

between the debtor ond
creditors.

review. A defoult or o
restructuring in the shodow of
defoult moy involve declining reol
incomes ond curtoiled privote

to support the need for

restructuring. One of the reosons
why the cost of restructuring is so
high is lhol it is usuolly subjected to
undue deloys, both in terms of
when the restructuring process is
initioted ond its durotion. For this
reoson, the mechonism should
creote incentives for on eorly ond

including ony other meosure thot
would interfere with controctuol

objectives invoriobly requires ond
roises o wide ronge of complex
issues of o legol ond finonciol
noture. With o view to ensuring
thot these issues ore resolved ond
the objectives ochieved, the
following principles should guide
the design:

Country experiences hod tended

. ln circumstonces where o
member's debt is unsustoinoble,
the mechonism should be
designed to cotolyze o ropid

omongst creditors but olso bring
on eorly ond effective diologue

will require odjustments to
sovereign debt burden, 4. ll.ll

complemented by other policies.
ln this wise, it is recognised thot
SDRM would constitute o centrol

encouroge defoults.

The mechonism should only be

to restructure debt thot is
judged to be unsustoinoble. lt
should neither increose the
likelihood of restructuring nor
used

designed in

o

be

monner thot

promotes greoter tronsporency in

the restructuring

Accordingly,

the

process.

mechonism
should estoblish procedures thot

enoble creditors to hove

odequote occess to informotion
regording the debtor's generol
situotion, including its oll overoll
debt (ond its treotment of
creditors thot moy nol be subject
to the mechonism), economic
prospects ond policies, ond the
proposed finoncing plon.
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systems.

. The mechonism

should
encouroge eorly ond octive
creditor porticipotion during the
restructuring process. ln oddition
to providing for o creditor vote on
the terms of o restructuring, the

fromework should enoble

creditors to ploy on octive role ot
eorlier stoges in the process,
including through the formotion of
creditors' committees.

.

The mechonism should not
interfere with the sovereignty of
debtors. The mechonism should
not be octivoted without the
sovereign'srequest. Accordingly,
the sovereign would only seek to
octivote the mechonism when it
hod formed o judgement thot the
feotures of the SDRM would

enhonce its copocity to
restructure

its

debt ropidly ond in o

monner thot limits economic

dislocotion.

.

The fromework should estoblish
incentives for o negotiotion. The
process of restructuring sovereign

debt is relotively complex,
requiring the resolution of o

. The integrity of the decision
moking process under the
mechonism should be
sofeguorded by on efficient ond

imporliol dispute resolution
process. Since the mechonism will

oggregote diverse cloims for
voting ond restructuring purposes,
disputes ore likely to orise os to the
volidity ond volue of these cloims.
Resolving these disputes in o foir,
importiol ond expeditious monner
is criticol to the success of the
restructuring exercise.
. Finolly, the formol role of the Fund
underthe SDRM should be limited.

Although the SDRM would be

estoblished lhrough on
omendment of the Fund's Articles
of Agreement, the SDRM should
not give the existing orgons of the
Fund ony new significont legol

powers.

number of difficult substontive ond

ll.lll

procedurol questions. To the

4.

extent possible, these issues should
be resolved through the give-ond-

Covered

toke of negotiotions

ond,

therefore, the mechonism should
not be designed in o monner thot
presumes o porticulor outcome.

.

The fromework needs to be
sufficiently flexible-ond simple- to
occommodote the operotion ond
evolution of copilol morkets. The
provisions of the SDRM must be
sufflciently cleor for the process to
be predictoble. At the some time,
however, itshould ovoid relying on
overly detoiled ond nonow rules
ond definitions thot will only invite

future circumvenlion lhrough
finonciol engineering.

. Since the fromework is intended
to fill o gop within the existing
fi nonciol orchitecture, it should not
be used to restructure the cloims
of public entities thot ore olreody
subject to domestic insolvencY

ln the finol

onolysis,

however, the fromework should
be designed to cotolyze eorlyond
effective diologue between the
debtor ond creditors-it should not
increose the role of the Fund in this
diologue.

.
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Specific exclusions from "eligible
cloims" would include:
v Cloims thot ore governed by
domestic low ond subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the
domestic courts. Although such
cloims would be restructured

outside the SDRM, the

tronsporency requirements of the
SDRM would ensure thot the
holders of externol cloims were
owore of the terms being offered
to the holders of domestic cloims
when they vote on o proposed
restructuring ogreement under
theSDRM.

v

Cloims

thot benefit from

privileges, such os secured cloims,
which could not be restructured

obsent the individuol consent of
the creditorin question. However,
to the extent thot the volue of the
cloim exceeds the volue of the
privilege, the "under secured"
portion would be subject to
restructuring under the SDRM.

v

Cloims held by internotionol
orgonisotions. reflecting the
unique role these institutions ploy

in the existing

internotionol

finonciolsystem.

Scope of Cloims to

Be

the mechonisms would
identify the scope of cloims thot
could potentiolly be subject to o
restructuring ("eligible cloims"),
whetherollorsome of these cloims
While

would be restructured in

o
porticulor cose would depend on
the negotiotions between the
debtor ond its creditors. As o
generolrule. eligible cloims would

include oll rights to receive
poyments reloting to the
commerciol octivities of the

sovereign. The centrol
government would hove the
option to includeits own debtond,
subject to the consent of the
debtor in question, cloims on: (i)
the centrol bonk ond (ii) public

5.0

coNcLustoN

The poper set out to explore the
origin ond role of IMF in lhe World

Economy. The study troces the
origin of lnternotionol Monetory
Fund (lMF), which with the

lnternotionol Bonk for
Reconstruction ond Development
(IBRD)
the World Bonk, formed

-

the Bretton wood

lnstitutions,
estoblished in July 1944 in New
Hompshire, USA.
ln the decodes since World Wor ll.

oport from rising prosperity, the
World Economy ond Monetory
System hove undergone other
mojor chonges. lts surveillonce
octivities hove been exponded
ond so hos the role the bonk ploys
countries ond verse

entities or sub-notionol to member
governments thot ore not subject verso.
to o domestic insolvency

Ropid odvonces in technology

fromework.

ond communicotion hove

45
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to the increosing

internotionol integrotion of
morkets ond closer linkoges
omong Notionol Economies. This
hos resulted in eosy spreod of
finonciol crises omong ond
between countries. when they
erupt.
Administrotively.

the IMF hos o

weighted voting system. The
lorger o country's quoto in the
Fund, the more votes the counlry
willhove. Also Boord decisions ore
bosed on consensus omong
members ond ore often supported

20

SDR is on internotionol reserve
osset, introduced in 1969. SDR is
therefore o Unit of Account. lts
volue is set doily using o bosket of

four mojor currencies. ond
reviewed every five yeors.

unonimously.
The IMF medium of Exchonge isthe
Speciol Drowing Right (SDR). The
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